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CURRENT COMPLICATIONS IN THE LAW ON
MYTHS AND STEREOTYPES
Lisa Dufraimont*
Myths and stereotypes represent an ongoing problem in Canadian sexual
assault trials. Often, and paradigmatically, defence lawyers and trial judges
rely on discredited sexist assumptions to the prejudice of female sexual
assault complainants. However, a review of the recent appellate case law
reveals many cases that do not fit this paradigm. Complications that have
arisen include stereotypes about men or accused persons, legitimate defence
arguments misidentified as stereotypes, close cases where reasonable people
disagree about whether stereotypes have been invoked, and prejudicial forms
of reasoning based other axes of discrimination. This paper surveys these
developments and assesses an attempt by the Court of Appeal for Ontario to
bring order to this area of law in the 2021 case of R v JC.
Les mythes et les stéréotypes continuent de s’inviter aux procès pour
agression sexuelle au Canada. De fait, les avocats de la défense et les juges
dans ces affaires s’appuient souvent, et de façon paradigmatique, sur des
préconceptions sexistes pourtant discréditées, au détriment des plaignantes.
Un examen de la jurisprudence d’appel récente révèle cependant qu’un
grand nombre d’affaires n’entrent pas dans ce paradigme. Parmi les
complications soulevées, notons des stéréotypes à l’égard des hommes ou
des accusés, des arguments de légitime défense perçus à tort comme issus de
stéréotypes, des affaires difficiles à trancher où la raison ne suffisait pas à
déterminer s’il était juste ou non de crier au stéréotype, et des raisonnements
préjudiciables basés sur d’autres motifs de discrimination. L’auteure recense
ces développements et évalue une tentative de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario
pour remettre de l’ordre dans ce domaine du droit dans l’affaire R v JC en
2021.

*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. A previous
version of this paper was prepared for the Law Society of Ontario’s Six Minute Criminal
Lawyer 2021 (24 April 2021). I am grateful to Martha Shaffer, Don Stuart and the
anonymous peer reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts and to my research
assistant, Jenny Kwok, for her valuable work.

2021] Current Complications in the Law on Myths and Stereotypes

537

Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
2. The original problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
3. Emerging concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
A) Stereotypes operating against men and accused persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
B) Legitimate inferences misidentified as stereotypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
C) Close cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
D) Beyond sex and gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557

4. A new framework of rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564

1. Introduction
When it came to light that an Alberta judge asked a teenaged complainant
in a 2014 trial why she couldn’t just keep her knees together to fend off
a sexual assault, it generated concern and condemnation across Canada
and around the world.1 Since that time, there has been heightened,
sustained public attention in Canada to the danger that rape myths may
be operating to the prejudice of complainants in sexual offence trials.2
Canadian courts have seen a corresponding explosion of case law as
1
See Sean Fine, “The Robin Camp transcript: ‘… keep your knees together’ and
other key passages”, The Globe and Mail (9 September 2016) online: <www.globeandmail.
com> [perma.cc/GAT6-96M3]; “Robin Camp faces review after Calgary law professors file
complaint”, CBC (10 November 2015) online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/ZZE3-V6YV]; Bill
Chappell, “Canadian Judge Resigns After Furor Over ‘Knees Together’ Remarks In Rape
Case”, NPR (10 March 2017) online: <www.npr.org> [perma.cc/H6L5-PFRL];“Canadian
judge faces inquiry over handling of sex assault trial”, BBC News (7 September 2016)
online: <www.bbc.com> [perma.cc/QX55-VYE5]; Ashifa Kassam, “Canada judge resigns
over ‘keep your knees together’ comment in rape trial”, The Guardian (9 March 2017)
online: <www.theguardian.com> [perma.cc/FM9B-FSVE].
2
See Samantha Beattie, “When Judges Make Sexual Assault Victims Feel Like
Criminals” HuffPost Canada (8 August 2019) online: <huffpost.com> [perma.cc/6RMP6QH3]; Kate Puddister & Danielle McNabb, “#MeToo: In Canada, rape myths continue
to prevent justice for sexual assault survivors”, The Conversation (5 March, 2019) online:
<www.theconversation.com> [perma.cc/H9EB-KPLT]; John Ibbitson, “The sooner
Parliament mandates sexual-assault training for judges, the better”, The Globe and Mail
(15 October 2020) online: <www.globeandmail.com> [perma.cc/F29P-NSVG]; Janice
Dickson, “Judicial council offers courses for judges on handling sex-assault cases”, The
Canadian Press (6 July 2018) online: <www.thecanadianpress.com> [perma.cc/7YPC2NDV]; Jennifer Koshan, Melanie Randall & Elizabeth Sheehy, “Marital rape myths
have no place in Canadian law”, The Globe and Mail (27 October 2017) online: <www.
globeandmail.com> [perma.cc/K5R3-BS4E].
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lawyers increasingly make claims that evidence and arguments put forward
by opposing counsel and the reasoning of judges in sexual offence cases
invoke prohibited stereotypical reasoning. The paradigm case has become
familiar: in a sexual assault trial, defence counsel, the trial judge, or both
rely on discredited myths and sexist stereotypes about complainants, often
under the guise of common sense. Judging by the public discourse, one
might think that all the cases on myths and stereotypes in sexual assault fit
this paradigm.3 Many do. But an examination of the recent cases reveals
an area of law that is much murkier and more complex.
The law of evidence sometimes addresses issues of discriminatory
and stereotypical reasoning in sexual assault within the context of
larger, established admissibility frameworks. The complex statutory
schemes governing other sexual activity evidence4 and the disclosure
and admissibility of private records pertaining to complainants5 are
examples. These areas of law are not the focus of this paper. Rather, this
analysis centres on what we might call the residual category of myths and
stereotypes in sexual assault: the prohibition of stereotypical reasoning in
and of itself, outside the context of a more specific regime of evidentiary
regulation. When courts reason that the complainant’s actions after an
alleged sexual assault should not be judged according to preconceived
notions or how a victim would behave,6 or when they reject arguments
that the complainant’s manner of dress undermines her credibility7 or
that passivity equals consent,8 they are operating within the doctrinal
space that concerns us here.
This analysis will show that the Canadian law on myths and stereotypes
in sexual assault has entered a turbulent period of growth and change.
What once may have been regarded as a straightforward matter of rooting
out tenacious sexist stereotypes about sexual assault complainants is being
recognized for the difficult and delicate exercise it is. Complications,
countercurrents and gray areas abound: stereotypes operating against
men or accused persons, legitimate defence arguments misidentified as
stereotypes, close cases where reasonable people might disagree about
3
See e.g. Elaine Craig, “Do we still need to teach judges not to rely on stereotypes
about sexualized violence?”, The Globe and Mail (1 March 2021) online: <www.
globeandmail.com> [perma.cc/V29N-WAL9].
4
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 276, 278.93–278.97.
5
Ibid, ss 278.1–278.97.
6
See R v Caesar, 2015 NWTCA 4 at para 6; R v CAM, 2017 MBCA 70 at paras
50–52.
7
See R v Cain, 2010 ABCA 371 at para 30; R v Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 4392 at para
188.
8
See R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193 [Ewanchuk SCC cited
to the SCR]; R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para 98 [Barton].
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whether stereotypes have been invoked, prejudicial forms of reasoning
based on race or other axes of discrimination, and so on. This paper
analyzes recent Canadian case law, with a focus on appellate cases decided
since 2019, and aims to reveal the complexity and ambivalence in this area
of law. The analysis unfolds in three parts. First, the original and very real
problem of sex and gender-based stereotyping in sexual offence cases will
be briefly discussed. Second, a number of emerging concerns in the law
on myths and stereotypes will be reviewed. Finally, a recent attempt by
the Court of Appeal for Ontario to frame clearer rules on stereotypical
reasoning in R v JC 9 will be outlined and evaluated.
2. The original problem
For decades, Canadian law has recognized that stereotypical and
discriminatory forms of reasoning often operate against complainants
in sexual offence cases. This reality has been extensively documented by
academic commentators10 and repeatedly acknowledged by the Supreme
Court of Canada, including in the following passage from R v Find:11
Traditional myths and stereotypes have long tainted the assessment of the conduct
and veracity of complainants in sexual assault cases—the belief that women of
“unchaste” character are more likely to have consented or are less worthy of belief;
that passivity or even resistance may in fact constitute consent; and that some
women invite sexual assault by reason of their dress or behaviour, to name only
a few. Based on overwhelming evidence from relevant social science literature,
this Court has been willing to accept the prevailing existence of such myths and
stereotypes.12

9

2021 ONCA 131 [JC].
See Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the
Legal Profession (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018); Susan Ehrlich,
“Perpetuating – and Resisting – Rape Myths in Trial Discourse” in Elizabeth A. Sheehy,
ed., Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, 2012), 389; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility,
and ‘Ideal victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22 CJWL 397; David
M. Tanovich, “Regulating Inductive Reasoning in Sexual Assault Cases” in Benjamin L.
Berger, Emma Cunliffe & James Stribopolous, eds., To Ensure that Justice is Done: Essays
in Memory of Marc Rosenberg (Aurora: Thomson Reuters, 2017) 73.
11
2001 SCC 32 [Find].
12
Ibid at para 101. See also R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 90, 180 DLR (4th) 1;
R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 83 DLR (4th) 193 [Seaboyer cited to the SCR];
R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595 at paras 48-53, 109 DLR (4th) 478 (Justice L’Heureux-Dubé,
dissenting).
10
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The Supreme Court jurisprudence on myths and stereotypes consistently
frames the central problem as one of discrimination on the basis of sex
and gender.13 Persons accused of sexual offences are overwhelmingly
male, while the great majority of complainants are female.14 The false
premises and discredited assumptions that operate in sexual offence cases
have generally targeted complainants as women and girls.15
At one time, the law openly embraced many of these sexist stereotypes.
Female rape complainants were viewed as so untrustworthy that it was
considered unsafe to ground a conviction on their testimony without
corroboration,16 there was a marital exception for the offence of rape,17 a
rape complainant’s failure to make an immediate report was considered “a
virtual self-contradiction of her story,”18 and sexually experienced women
were understood as less credible and more likely to consent.19 In the
1980s and 90s, these overtly discriminatory principles were excised from
Canadian law through statutory changes brought about by feminist law
reform efforts.20 The risk of stereotyping sexual assault complainants in
13
See especially the concurring reasons of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Ewanchuk
SCC, supra note 8 (linking myths and stereotypes in sexual assault to Canada’s international
obligations to protect women from sex discrimination).
14
See Statistics Canada, “Police-reported sexual assaults in Canada, 2009 to 2014:
A statistical profile”, by Cristine Rotenberg, in Juristat, Catalogue no. 85-002-X (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 3 October 2017) (in a study of police-reported sexual assaults in Canada,
87% of victims were female and 98% of accused persons charged were male).
15
See R v AL, 2020 BCCA 18, application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada dismissed 25 June 2020 [AL] (the Court of Appeal for British Columbia held
that “the phrase ‘gender-based myths’ reflects both the gendered nature of sexual violence
and the inescapable reality that the myths and stereotypes the law has recently attempted
to ferret out have traditionally disadvantaged female complainants” at para 231).
16
Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c 34, s 142.
17
Ibid, s 143.
18
Kribs et al v The Queen, [1960] SCR 400 at 405, 127 CCC 1.
19
Seaboyer, supra note 12 at 604.
20
Sexual offences in the Criminal Code were overhauled in 1982, when the offence
of rape was repealed and replaced with the offence of sexual assault: An Act to amend
the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person
and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, SC 198081-82, c 125, s 19. The doctrine of recent complaint, which enshrined the expectation of
immediate reporting, was statutorily abrogated (Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 275) and
the corroboration requirement was removed (ibid s 274). For discussion of the history and
context of these reforms, see Christine LM Boyle, Sexual Assault (Toronto: Carswell, 1984).
The current statutory restrictions on evidence of the complainant’s other sexual activity,
which forbid use of this evidence to support the twin myths that sexual experience makes
women less credible more likely to consent, became law in 1992: Criminal Code, supra note
4, s 276. Some amendments to the substantive and procedural provisions relating to sexual
assault were introduced in 2018, but these did not substantially change the rules discussed
here.
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more subtle ways persisted, however, because sexists myths and attitudes
remained prevalent in society and among justice system participants. In
the landmark case of R v Seaboyer,21 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé delivered an
influential and frequently-cited judgment in partial dissent that catalogued
numerous common mythical and discriminatory beliefs surrounding
sexual assault,22 including the faulty notions that women are required to
struggle to defend themselves against rape, that they frequently fantasize
and lie about rape, and that a rapist is always “a stranger who leaps out
of the bushes.”23 As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé observed, when police
officers, prosecutors, judges and jurors engage in these stereotypical ways
of thinking, the investigation and prosecution of sexual offences can be
derailed.24
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé further noted in Seaboyer that the prevalence
of stereotypical thinking about sexual assault raises problems for
determining the relevance of evidence and finding facts.25 In Canadian
law, evidence is presumptively admissible if it is relevant to the facts in
issue, and relevance is determined by assessing the relationship between
the evidence and the facts in issue in light of logic, human experience, and
common sense.26 As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé recognized in Seaboyer,
sexual assault is an area “where experience, common sense and logic are
informed by stereotype and myth,”27 which raises a concern that relevance
determinations and, ultimately, findings of fact in sexual assault cases may
be influenced by stereotypical thinking. In sum, because judges and juries
are permitted, and even required, to rely on their common sense and
human experience in adjudicating cases, there is a risk that biases that are
prevalent in society will find their way into Canadian courtrooms.28
And indeed, in the decades since our sexual assault laws were
overhauled and Seaboyer was decided, stereotypes against women and
sexual assault complainants have been raised in many sexual offence
prosecutions. In another landmark case, R v Ewanchuk,29 the trial judge
relied on a doctrine of “implied consent”30 to acquit the accused of sexual
21

Seaboyer, supra note 12.
Ibid at 651–653.
23
Ibid at 654.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid at 678–680.
26
Ibid; R v Watson (1996), 30 OR (3d) 161, 50 CR (4th) 245 at 257 (CA).
27
Seaboyer, supra note 12 at 679.
28
Ibid at 679–680; Find, supra note 11 at para 103. For discussion of the relationship
between common sense reasoning and stereotypes, see Tanovich, supra note 10.
29
Supra note 8.
30
Ibid at para 31.
22
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assault even though he found that the complainant repeatedly said no
to the accused’s progressively intrusive acts of sexual touching, did not
consent in her mind and was fearful throughout the encounter. The
majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s appeal, noting that
the complainant did not arrive on the scene “in a bonnet and crinolines”31
and that she could have stopped the accused with a “well-directed knee.”32
The full Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeal and
entered a conviction. The majority judgment of Justice Major held that
the courts below made fundamental errors about the nature of consent:
there was no defence of implied consent and the key question was whether
the complainant consented in her mind, which, on the facts as found by
the trial judge, she did not. In a concurring judgment, Justice L’HeureuxDubé (Justice Gonthier concurring) agreed with the majority but went
further, stating that the case was “about myths and stereotypes”33 and that
the Court had a responsibility to complainants to recognize and denounce
stereotypical reasoning in sexual assault cases.34 Among the “mythical
assumptions” she identified in the lower courts’ judgments were the ideas
that a woman who says no really means yes, that the complainant invited
the sexual assault and that it was her responsibility to physically resist the
accused’s advances.35
The concurring judgment of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Ewanchuk
is an early and influential example of what has become the paradigm for
judicial reasoning about myths and stereotypes in sexual assault. In this
paradigm, the court explicitly identifies and rejects discriminatory lines
of reasoning about women and sexual assault complainants that have
been invoked and, typically, represented as matters of common sense by
defence lawyers or judges at lower levels of court.
Nearly 20 years later, in R v Wagar, the case referenced at the beginning
of this paper, the trial judge made numerous troubling comments,
including asking the complainant why she could not keep her knees
together or sink her pelvis into the basin of a bathroom sink to prevent
the accused from penetrating her vaginally.36 As in Ewanchuk, the judge
evidently relied on the faulty notion that a complainant must signal non-

31

R v Ewanchuk, 1998 ABCA 52 at para 4.
Ibid at para 21.
33
Ewanchuk SCC, supra note 8 at para 82.
34
Ibid at para 95.
35
Ibid at paras 87–93.
36
R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327 [Wagar]; Canadian Judicial Council, Inquiry into
the Conduct of the Honourable Robin Camp: Report to the Minister of Justice (Ottawa:
Canadian Judicial Council, 2017) at para 17 [Camp Inquiry Report].
32
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consent with physical resistance.37 The trial judge, former judge Robin
Camp, acquitted Wagar, but the Court of Appeal of Alberta set aside the
acquittal on grounds including that the trial judge misunderstood the law
on consent and relied on “sexual stereotypes and stereotypical myths,
which have long since been discredited.”38 Former judge Camp’s conduct
of the trial was so egregious that it led to a complaint to the Canadian
Judicial Council, which held an inquiry and recommended his removal
from the bench.39 He subsequently resigned.
A trial judge’s reliance on stereotypes about sexual assault complainants
also led to a successful Crown appeal in R v ARJD.40 The Crown alleged
that the accused sexually abused his step-daughter when she was between
11 and 16 years of age. There was no evidence that the complainant took
steps to avoid the accused during that period. In acquitting the accused,
the trial judge cautioned himself against relying on stereotypes about the
“expected behaviour of the usual victim”41 but went on to reason that “[a]s
a matter of logic and common sense, one would expect that a victim of
sexual abuse would demonstrate behaviours consistent with that abuse
or at least some change of behaviour such as avoiding the perpetrator.”42
The Court of Appeal of Alberta divided over whether the trial judge had
engaged in prohibited stereotypical reasoning, with the majority holding
that he had erred in this way and overturning the acquittal. The Supreme
Court of Canada dismissed the accused’s further appeal in brief oral
reasons that substantially adopted the majority reasons of Justices Paperny
and Schutz in the Court of Appeal. On behalf of the seven-member Court,
Chief Justice Wagner observed:
In considering the lack of evidence of the complainant’s avoidance
of the appellant, the trial judge committed the very error he had
earlier in his reasons instructed himself against: he judged the
complainant’s credibility based solely on the correspondence
between her behaviour and the expected behaviour of the
stereotypical victim of sexual assault. This constituted an error
of law.43
37
See R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 at para 156 (discussing the “‘ghost element’ of
victim resistance” in sexual assault); R v Nikdima, 2021 SKCA 60 (“[i]t is without question
that it is an error in principle to suggest that victims of sexual assault must actively resist”
at para 55).
38
Wagar, supra note 36 at para 4.
39
Camp Inquiry Report, supra note 36.
40
2017 ABCA 237 [ARJD Alta CA], aff’d 2018 SCC 6 [ARJD SCC].
41
ARJD Alta CA, supra note 40 at para 22 (quoting from the trial judge’s reasons).
42
Ibid at para 23 (quoting from the trial judge’s reasons).
43
ARJD SCC, supra note 40 at para 2.
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ARJD has been frequently cited for the propositions that courts must avoid
relying on rigid expectations about how people act after being sexually
assaulted44 and that reliance on stereotypes in deciding a case can amount
to an error of law.45
The Canadian Judicial Council released its report recommending
Robin Camp’s removal from the bench in 2017, and the Supreme Court
of Canada decided ARJD in 2018. These developments corresponded
in time with the rise of the #MeToo movement and heightened public
interest in the prosecution of sexual offences.46 In Canada, the danger that
complainants might face sexist stereotyping from lawyers and judges has
become a prominent part of the public discourse around sexual assault.47
The last few years have also seen a proliferation of case law on myths
and stereotypes, much of which tracks the familiar paradigm of courts
repudiating stereotypical and sexist lines of reasoning used against sexual
assault complainants by defence lawyers and trial judges. Courts across
Canada have released numerous decisions in this vein since 2019. For
example, in R v AE,48 the trial judge acquitted two adult males accused
of sexual assault after they, together with a male young person, engaged
in oral and vaginal sex with a female complainant while also committing
various acts of violence against her, including slapping and punching her.
Many of these acts were captured on video. The trial judge found that the
complainant initially consented to rough group sex but did not consider
whether that consent was withdrawn when the complainant repeatedly
cried out in pain, said “no” and pleaded with the accused to stop.49 The
Court of Appeal of Alberta was unanimous in setting aside the acquittals
and entering convictions on the charge of sexual assault, with two of three
appellate judges concluding that the trial judge erred in relying on the
faulty notion that the complainant offered “broad advance consent” to
whatever violence the accused decided to inflict on her.50 In the words
44

para 28.

See R v Greif, 2021 BCCA 187 at paras 26, 28, 66; R v CLS, 2021 ABCA 147 at

45
See Lemire-Tousignant c R, 2020 QCCA 1065 at para 10 [Lemire-Tousignant]; R
v CMM, 2020 BCCA 56 at para 139.
46
See generally Robyn Doolittle, Had it Coming: What’s Fair in the Age of #MeToo
(Toronto: Allen Lane, 2019).
47
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. Recent books by journalist Robyn
Doolittle, supra note 46, and legal scholar Elaine Craig, supra note 10, both address this
danger.
48
2021 ABCA 172 [AE].
49
Ibid at para 40.
50
Ibid at para 35 (Justice Martin) and para 152 (Justice Pentelechuk). The third
judge, Justice O’Ferrall, found it unnecessary to address whether the complainant consented
because, in his view, the acts of sexual violence were such that consent was not available
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of Justice Pentelechuk, the trial judge’s reasoning raised “myth- and
stereotype-based thinking that continues to linger in the legal landscape
like a fungus: because the complainant initiated group sex and asked that
it be rough, she got what she asked for.”51
Other examples of cases where appellate courts have explicitly
rejected sexist stereotypes relied on by trial judges and defence lawyers
include R v Lacombe,52 in which the trial judge attributed significance to
the facts that the complainant did not immediately report a sexual assault
and that she wore loose fitting pyjamas without a bra or underwear in
her encounters with the accused. The Court of Appeal for Ontario set
aside the acquittal, noting that “[r]eliance on discredited stereotypes in
the assessment of credibility is an error of law”53 and observing the idea
that delayed reporting undermines a complainant’s credibility is a wellknown myth and that the complainant’s attire “does not signify consent,
nor does it justify assaultive behavior.”54 The Court of Appeal for Ontario
set aside another acquittal in R v ABA55 on the ground that the trial judge
improperly measured the complainant’s actions during, between, and
after an alleged series of sexual assaults against “how the trial judge would
have reasonably expected her to behave.”56 The evidence that the trial
judge wrongly weighed against the complainant’s credibility included that
she continued to associate with the accused after the initial assaults and
that she did not escape or cry out for help. In R v Durocher,57 the Court
of Appeal for Saskatchewan held that the trial judge was right to reject a
defence argument that the complainant’s failure to fight back or scream
represented odd behaviour that undermined her credibility; the trial judge
had “correctly identified this argument as a sexual myth.”58
as a defence. In Barton, supra note 8 at para 99, the Supreme Court held that the notion
of “broad advance consent” is inconsistent with the meaning of consent in Canadian law.
The two accused in AE, supra note 48, also faced a separate charge of sexual assault with a
weapon in relation to the insertion of an electric toothbrush into the complainant’s vagina.
At trial, one of the accused was convicted of this charge and the other was acquitted. The
Crown’s appeal against the acquittal was dismissed because the judges of the Court of
Appeal were unable to agree on the appropriate disposition.
51
Supra note 48 at para 153.
52
2019 ONCA 938 [Lacombe].
53
Ibid at para 33.
54
Ibid at para 39.
55
2019 ONCA 124.
56
Ibid at para 11.
57
2019 SKCA 97.
58
Ibid at para 120. See also R v Gill, 2021 BCSC 332 (rejecting as stereotypical
defence counsel’s argument that the complainant’s testimony was contrary to common
sense because she admitted that, after being sexually assaulted, she used the washroom,
talked to the accused and ate a banana before leaving his home); R v JE, 2019 NLSC 231
(rejecting a defence argument that the complainant’s failure to flee from the car while the
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In summary, a review of the recent cases confirms that both lawyers and
judges continue to introduce mythical and discriminatory inferences that
operate against women and complainants in sexual assault prosecutions.
In response, a substantial body of recent case law references the prohibition
on stereotypical reasoning and explicitly rejects these kinds of prohibited
inferences.59 These cases reflect a recognition, now well-accepted in the
law and in the public sphere, that sexual assault complainants have faced
and continue to face sex and gender-based stereotyping in the courts.
3. Emerging concerns
As the foregoing discussion has shown, many recent cases fit the familiar
paradigm of courts repudiating sexist stereotypes against sexual assault
complainants that are advanced by defence lawyers and lower court judges.
What is perhaps surprising about the recent cases on sexual assault myths
is how many of them do not fit that paradigm. This part of the analysis
examines trends and emerging concerns in the cases that are taking the
law in this area in new directions.
A) Stereotypes operating against men and accused persons
Increasingly, courts recognize that stereotypes about sexual behaviour can
operate not only against women and sexual assault complainants but also
against men and persons accused of sexual assault.60 On the rare occasions
where the accused is a woman, gender-based sexual assault myths may
be deployed in favour of the prosecution. On the other hand, stereotypes
about male and female sexuality are sometimes used against men accused
of sexual offences.61 Several recent appellate decisions grapple with these
problems.
In R v Chen,62 the adult female accused was charged with sexual
assault after she had sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old boy who was
living in the same transition house. The accused acknowledged that
sexual activity was ongoing suggested that she consented because it improperly relied on
“myths and stereotypes about how people, and women in particular, behave” at para 78).
59
In addition to the cases cited in the last two paragraphs, see R v Spicer, 2021
ONSC 398 (trial judge improperly reasoned that the complainant entering a washroom
stall with the accused amounted to consent to the sexual activity that took place there).
60
See Lemire-Tousignant, supra note note 45 at para 10; R v TL, 2020 NUCA 10 at
para 35.
61
See e.g. R v Heymerdinguer, 2021 ABCA 112 at 47 (a sexual assault case in which
both the accused and the complainant were men. The Court of Appeal of Alberta held that
it would amount to impermissible stereotyping to reason that a heterosexual man would
not consent to sexual activity with another man).
62
2020 BCCA 329.

2021] Current Complications in the Law on Myths and Stereotypes

547

intercourse occurred but testified that the young complainant forced
her and she did not consent. In his charge, the trial judge instructed the
jury to consider a range of facts in determining whether the accused was
a willing participant, including that she did not cry out for assistance
during the sexual activity and that she did not avoid the complainant
after the alleged assault. The jury convicted the accused, but the Court of
Appeal for British Columbia set aside the conviction, noting that the trial
judge failed to caution the jury against relying on stereotypes, including
expectations that victims cry out while being assaulted and thereafter
avoid perpetrators. The trial judge was required to offer “a clear, specific
and contemporaneous caution to avoid impermissible reasoning based on
discredited stereotypes.”63 Instead, she invited the jury to rely on sexual
assault myths to the prejudice of the female accused.64 Chen demonstrates
that, in cases where the accused is a woman, there is a danger of wellknown sexist stereotypes being used to the prejudice of the accused.
R v Cepic 65 raised the problem of stereotypes about male and female
sexuality operating against a man accused of sexual assault. The accused
was a male dancer in a strip club who engaged in sexual activity with a
female customer. The complainant testified that the accused forced fellatio
and intercourse on her during a lap dance, while the accused testified that
the complainant was a willing participant in the sexual activity. The trial
judge convicted the accused, finding that the complainant was a credible
and reliable witness while the accused’s testimony was implausible. For
example, the trial judge reasoned that because the complainant had never
had a lap dance before, she would not have touched the accused’s penis
before the alleged assault as the accused claimed. The trial judge also
concluded that the accused’s account suggesting that the complainant was
the sexual aggressor did not accord with common sense. The Court of
Appeal for Ontario set aside the conviction, holding that the trial judge
erred in relying on “assumptions about what a woman would or would
not do”66 and “stereotypes about male aggression.”67 The appeal court
concluded that the trial judge’s characterization of the accused’s testimony
as implausible was based not on the evidence but on these improper
63
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assumptions. It appears that trial judge dismissed the defence claim that
the complainant was the sexual aggressor largely because it conflicted
with her “common sense” view that men, but not women, are sexually
aggressive.
In R v Quartey,68 the male accused was charged with sexually assaulting
a female acquaintance who testified that he forced intercourse on her after
she repeatedly rejected his advances. The accused testified that the sexual
activity was consensual and much of it was initiated by the complainant,
that he asked her three times before they had intercourse and that she said
“yes” each time. The trial judge convicted, rejecting the accused’s evidence
as insincere and unbelievable and accepting the complainant’s evidence
as sincere and candid. Among the elements of the accused’s testimony
that the trial judge rejected as unbelievable were his claims that he was
not really interested in sex but just wanted to undress and fool around
and that he refused the complainant’s attempt to perform fellatio on him
because he does not like that.
Parts of the trial judge’s reasons in Quartey suggested that he was
operating on some questionable premises: for example, that men are more
interested in engaging in sex than women and that all men like fellatio.
The Court of Appeal of Alberta split over whether the trial judge relied
on impermissible reasoning. In dissent, Justice Berger concluded that the
trial judge erred in relying on inappropriately generalized “assumption of
normative behaviour.”69 The majority dismissed the conviction appeal,
holding that, in the context of the reasons as a whole, the trial judge’s
comments were not about “men in general”70 but, rather, were conclusions
about the accused that found reasonable support in the evidence. The
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused’s further appeal in brief
reasons, agreeing with the majority in the Court of Appeal that the trial
judge’s conclusions were specific to the accused in the circumstances
and did not reflect a “stereotypical understanding of how men in those
circumstances would conduct themselves.”71 The clear implication of
Quartey, however, is that the accused’s appeal would have succeeded if the
trial judge had indeed relied on stereotypes about men and male sexuality.
Similar issues reached the Supreme Court of Canada again in R v
Delmas,72 which like Quartey was a defence appeal as of right that was
dismissed in brief reasons. In Delmas, the accused testified that he was
in a relationship with another woman but that he also considered that he
68
69
70
71
72

2018 ABCA 12 [Quartey Alta CA], aff’d 2018 SCC 59 [Quartey SCC].
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and the complainant were boyfriend and girlfriend when they engaged in
the sexual activity charged as sexual assault; he further testified that the
complainant consented to have unprotected sex with him even though she
knew he was positive for Hepatitis C. In rejecting the accused’s testimony,
the trial judge reasoned that these and other parts of the accused’s account
did not make sense. Dissenting judges in the Court of Appeal of Alberta
and the Supreme Court of Canada would have allowed the accused’s
appeal on the basis that the trial judge engaged in prohibited stereotypical
reasoning. As Justice O’Ferrall explained in dissent, the concern was that
the judge relied on “stereotypical views and generalizations”73 about how
both the accused and the complainant would be expected to conduct their
sex lives. Majorities in both Courts dismissed the accused’s appeal, with
the majority of the Supreme Court holding that the trial judge did not
engage in stereotyping and that any inferential error he might have made
about the accused’s relationships was harmless. Still, the majority of the
Court of Appeal described the trial judge’s reasoning about the accused’s
relationships as “problematic”,74 while the majority of the Supreme Court
labelled it “illogical.”75 Since all the appellate judges found the trial judge’s
reasoning about the plausibility of the accused’s account to be problematic
at best, Delmas arguably provides further support for the proposition that
a trial judge can fall into error by relying on stereotypical assumptions
about what a man accused of sexual assault might have done.
Finally, in R v JC, the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal
against conviction in part because the trial judge relied on stereotypical
generalizations about sexual behaviour to the prejudice of the male
accused.76 The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a female
friend. He testified that the sexual activity was consensual and that his
practice was to expressly seek the complainant’s consent before engaging
in sexual activity. The trial judge rejected the accused’s testimony on this
point on the grounds that it ran against “common sense and experience
about how sexual encounters unfold”77 and was “too perfect, too
mechanical, too rehearsed, and too politically correct to be believed.”78
Writing for the Court, Justice Paciocco concluded that this part of the trial
judge’s reasoning was impermissible for two reasons. First, it relied on
a “bald generalization”79 about human behaviour that was not properly
grounded in the evidence. Second, it invoked a stereotype that no one
73
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acts so carefully to ensure sexual consent. In discussing the prohibition
on stereotypical reasoning, Justice Paciocco held that stereotypes about
complainants and accused persons are both impermissible and “equally
wrong.”80
B) Legitimate inferences misidentified as stereotypes
Stereotyping sexual assault complainants is an error of law, and trial
judges must refuse to engage in such prohibited reasoning even when
invited to do so by defence counsel. The fact that trial judges are ultimately
responsible for rejecting stereotypical reasoning raises the risk that, if their
understanding of the prohibited lines of reasoning is faulty or imprecise,
they might erroneously exclude relevant evidence or legitimate inferences
advanced by the defence.81 Relatedly, there is a risk that some Crown
prosecutors might argue for an overbroad application of the concept of
myths and stereotypes that could lead to the inappropriate rejection of
defence evidence. These risks have materialized in a number of recent
cases.
In R v Percy,82 the Crown advanced an overly broad understanding of
the prohibition on stereotypical reasoning. The male accused was charged
with sexual assault and related offences including voyeurism after he
engaged in sexual activity with the female complainant, some of which he
recorded on video. The trial judge acquitted the accused on the ground
that he harboured a reasonable doubt on the issue of consent. He reasoned
that some of the complainant’s actions as captured on video, such as
giggling during oral sex and responding affirmatively when the accused
asked if she liked his penis, were suggestive of her willing participation
in the sexual activity. On appeal, the Crown argued that the trial judge
engaged in stereotypical reasoning in relation to consent, emphasizing that
the complainant testified that she did not consent to the sexual activity.
However, as Justice Beveridge pointed out on behalf of the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal, a complainant’s testimony that she did not consent is not
conclusive of the issue; a trial judge is required to assess that testimonial
claim in the context of the evidence as a whole.83 On examination, the
argument advanced by the Crown in Percy appears to rely on a premise
that the complainant’s direct testimony of non-consent should be treated
as determinative and that any resort to circumstantial evidence of her state
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of mind, including evidence of her own words and actions at the very time
of the sexual activity, amounts to reliance on stereotypes.
Canadian law is clear that states of mind can be proven by direct
or circumstantial evidence,84 and the Supreme Court of Canada held in
Ewanchuk that “the complainant’s words and actions, before and during
the incident, [may] raise a reasonable doubt against her assertion that she,
in her mind, did not want the sexual touching to take place”.85 Thus, triers
of fact are entitled to infer that a complainant who responded positively
during sexual activity was more likely to be consenting. This kind of
reasoning does not amount to impermissible stereotyping, and the Crown
in Percy was overreaching by suggesting that it did. The Court of Appeal
rightly rejected the Crown’s stereotyping argument in Percy, concluding
that the trial judge appropriately assessed the complainant’s credibility in
the context of all the evidence. As Justice Beveridge wrote for the Court,
the trial judge did not engage in stereotyping and “never expressed any
preconceived expectations about how an actual victim should behave, but
instead he examined how this complainant behaved.”86 Percy provides a
clear example of Crown counsel pressing an overly expansive view of the
rule against stereotyping that, if accepted, would lead to the rejection of
legitimate defence evidence.
In JC,87 which was discussed in the previous section, the Court
of Appeal for Ontario determined that the trial judge erred when he
dismissed a defence argument about the complainant’s motive to fabricate
as based on stereotype. The Crown alleged that the accused engaged in
non-consensual sex with the complainant on several occasions after
threatening to post a sexually-explicit video of her on the internet if she did
not participate in the sexual activity. The complainant testified that, before
she reported these assaults to police, she disclosed the sexual activity with
the accused to her boyfriend, who was angry and upset and urged her to
call the police. The defence suggested that the complainant had a motive
to fabricate her sexual assault allegations to conceal her infidelity and
preserve her relationship with her boyfriend. In his reasons for convicting
the accused, the trial judge rejected this suggestion, stating that there was
no evidence to support it and that it invoked “stereotypical reasoning.”88
In allowing the appeal, the Justice Paciocco concluded that the trial judge
erred in rejecting the defence’s theory about the complainant’s motive,
reasoning that “it is an error for a trial judge to exclude an inference as
84
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based on stereotype, when it is not based on stereotype.”89 He concluded
that the defence submission about the complainant’s motive to lie was not
based on stereotype but was, instead, an available inference grounded in
the evidence.
A similar problem arose in R v Esquivel-Benitez.90 The male accused
was charged with sexual assault after he had sexual intercourse with an
adult female acquaintance in his home while her husband was asleep in
an adjacent room. The complainant’s husband came into the room as
the sexual activity was ending and promptly became enraged. On their
walk home, the complainant’s husband persistently demanded that she
tell him what happened, repeatedly asking whether or suggesting that the
accused had abused her. At first, the complainant did not say that she had
been assaulted. She told her husband that the accused assaulted her only
after they returned home and in response to his persistent questioning.91
At trial, the central issue was consent. The defence suggested that these
interactions with her husband undermined the complainant’s credibility,
but the trial judge rejected this submission as “part of an ongoing myth
regarding sexual consent.”92 The Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded
that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence submission about this
evidence, which “ought to have been considered and not dismissed as
irrelevant by the trial judge.”93 The evidence was relevant because it could
have supported an inference that the complainant had a motive to lie.
Trial judges must, of course, avoid stereotypes about complainants’
truthfulness. For example, it would be an error for a trial judge to rely on
the idea that sexual assault complainants are generally untrustworthy94
or that they are generally likely to lie to conceal from partners and family
members that they have consented to sexual activity.95 JC and EsquivelBenitez remind us, however, that where there is an evidentiary basis for
a defence suggestion that a particular complainant had a specific motive
to lie, a trial judge is required to give that suggestion fair consideration.
Ultimately, in their role as triers of fact, it would have been open to the
trial judges in these cases to consider these defence suggestions about
the complainants’ motives to lie in the context of all the evidence and
89
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reject them. What was not open to the trial judges was to dismiss these
submissions out of hand by labelling them stereotypes.96
R v Roth 97 is another case where a trial judge relied on the rule against
stereotyping to improperly dismiss evidence that grounded a legitimate
inference favourable to the defence. The female complainant testified that
the male accused forced sexual intercourse on her in her home, while the
accused testified that the sexual activity was consensual. The trial judge
convicted the accused, but the Court of Appeal for British Columbia
set aside the conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s scrutiny of the
evidence was uneven and resulted in an unfair trial. Among the frailties
in the complainant’s evidence that the trial judge failed to consider was a
contradiction between her evidence and the evidence of a taxi driver who
interacted with her shortly after the alleged sexual assault. The complainant
testified that, when she spoke with the taxi driver at the door of her home,
she was unable to reach out for assistance because she remained under the
control of the accused, who was monitoring her from the bottom of the
stairs. By contrast, the taxi driver testified that the complainant exited her
home and closed the door behind her before their interaction, which would
have put her outside the control of the accused. The Court of Appeal held
that the trial judge was right to reject an improper defence argument that
the complainant’s failure to disclose the assault to the taxi driver, in and of
itself, undermined her credibility. However, the trial judge ought to have
considered how the inconsistency between the complainant’s testimony
and that of the taxi driver affected her credibility. As the Court of Appeal
explained, even where “a piece of evidence may carry the potential for
impermissible reasoning, it may also have a permissible role to play”98 in
supporting legitimate inferences.
Finally, R v Cooke,99 like Roth, involved a successful defence appeal
based on the trial judge’s failure to consider inconsistencies in the
complainant’s testimonial account. Specifically, there were internal and
external inconsistencies regarding the complainant’s interactions with
emergency and medical personnel and her refusal to participate in a Sexual
Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) procedure. The trial judge repeatedly
cautioned herself to avoid stereotypical inferences and appeared to avoid
addressing conflicts in the complainant’s evidence for fear of engaging in
prohibited reasoning. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal noted that the trial
judge correctly determined that the complainant’s refusal to participate in
the SANE procedure and failure to report the sexual assault to emergency
96
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medical personnel were not factors that undermined her credibility.
However, to the extent that her evidence contained inconsistencies and
contradictions on these matters, the trial judge erred in failing to consider
these defects in assessing the complainant’s evidence. The Court of Appeal
concluded that the conviction could not stand because the trial judge’s
“overemphasis of cautions against stereotypical reasoning fettered her
task of making credibility assessments.”100
To summarize, in several recent sexual assault cases, relevant defence
evidence and legitimate inferences favourable to the defence have been
misidentified as impermissible stereotypes. It is worth noting that this
misidentification problem has a constitutional dimension, since the right
of the accused to make full answer and defence is protected under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.101 That right is at risk when
Crown attorneys and trial judges embrace an overly broad understanding
of what is prohibited by the rule against stereotypical reasoning.
C) Close cases
While stereotypes against sexual assault complainants are often easy to
identify, in some cases it can be difficult to discern whether or not stereotypes
have been invoked. The distinction between legitimate inferences and
prohibited stereotyping can be elusive and context-dependent. The
difficulty of this distinction may account for the significant number of
cases in which appellate courts have divided over whether a lower court
judgment was based on impermissible stereotypes: Quartey,102 Delmas103
and ARJD104 are all examples discussed above.
Another such case is R v Steele,105 where judges of the Court of Appeal
for Ontario disagreed about whether the trial judge engaged in stereotyping
in relation to the complainant’s reasons for entering an abandoned trailer.
The accused and the complainant were acquaintances who visited at
the complainant’s home with her parents, after which the complainant
offered to walk the accused partway home. On the walk, they entered the
abandoned trailer and engaged in sexual activity that the complainant
claimed was non-consensual but the accused testified was consensual.
In his reasons for acquitting the accused, the trial judge stated that the
100
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complainant’s credibility was damaged by her inability or unwillingness
to provide a reason for entering the trailer with the accused late at night,
which the trial judge considered inconsistent with her testimony that she
did not like the accused. Writing for a majority of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario, Justice Benotto overturned the acquittal and concluded that the
trial judge erred in relying on the stereotype “that a woman would not
enter a building at night with a man unless she wanted sex.”106 Justice
van Rensburg, who issued a separate concurring judgment, would have
allowed the appeal on other grounds but disagreed with the majority on
the trial judge’s reasoning about the trailer. For Justice van Rensburg, the
trial judge was drawing reasonable inferences from the circumstantial
evidence when he assessed the complainant’s claim that she did not like
the accused and was only walking with him to be polite “against the fact
that she had gone into the trailer with him at a late hour ‘for no reason’
when she was expected home.”107
Steele illuminates a key reason why the distinction between
impermissible stereotyping and legitimate inferences can be difficult to
draw: stereotyping, where it occurs, is rarely express. Appellate courts
must interpret trial judges’ reasons to discern whether they reveal implicit
reliance on myths and stereotypes. In some cases, the implication is
relatively easy to spot. For example, when the trial judge in Lacombe
cryptically stated that the fact that the complainant wore loose-fitting
pajamas without undergarments was “significant”, the only reasonable
interpretation was that the trial judge improperly reasoned that the
complainant invited the sexual activity through her manner of dress.108
In other cases, trial judges’ reasons are more difficult to interpret. In
Steele, while the idea that women only enter buildings with men at night
to have sex obviously constitutes an indefensible stereotype,109 it is less
clear whether the trial judge actually relied on that idea. His reasoning
about the trailer could be read as implicitly relying on that stereotype, but
it could also be interpreted more benignly as raising concerns about the
coherence and consistency of the complainant’s account of events. To the
extent that both interpretations appear plausible, the latter interpretation
is arguably preferable because it accords with the principle that trial judges
are presumed to know the law.110 That is, an appellate court arguably
106
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should not infer that a trial judge engaged in stereotypical reasoning when
an innocuous interpretation of the reasons is available.111
Regrettably, Canadian courts have yet to find a consistent approach
to deciding how much to read in to trial judges’ reasons in determining
whether stereotyping has occurred. In Quartey, the accused’s claim that
he does not like fellatio was rejected by the trial judge as unbelievable—a
conclusion that appeared unconnected to any factual circumstances.112
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined that this and other
conclusions the trial judge made were specific findings about the accused
that were not based on generalizations about men. In Steele, by contrast,
the trial judge’s reasoning about the trailer was connected to a number of
specific facts: as Justice van Rensberg noted, the complainant’s decision
to enter the trailer with the accused late at night when she was expected
home was arguably in tension with her testimonial claims that she did
not like him and was only walking with him out of politeness. Yet, in
that case, the majority determined that the trial judge’s reasons implicitly
relied on a stereotype. If, in Steele, the trial judge’s reasoning about the
trailer was properly understood as implicitly relying on the stereotype that
women only enter buildings with men at night to have sex, then arguably
the trial judge’s conclusion in Quartey that the accused’s testimony was
unbelievable should have been read as implicitly invoking a stereotype
that all men like fellatio. The opposing results in these cases are difficult
to reconcile and reflect a lack of clarity in the law about when appellate
courts should infer that a trial judge has engaged in stereotyping.
The decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in R v
AL113 illustrates another difficulty with the distinction between legitimate
inferences and impermissible stereotypes: the extent to which it depends
on context. In AL, evidence that likely would have been admissible to go to
consent in a case of acquaintance sexual assault was inadmissible because
it raised the spectre of stereotyping in the context of an allegation of longterm abuse. The accused was charged with sexual offences against a female
complainant who was left in his care when she was 8 years old. The Crown
alleged that the accused sexually abused the complainant from that time for
almost three decades and that he used threats to ensure the complainant’s
compliance with his sexual demands. The accused testified that his longterm sexual relationship with the complainant was consensual and began
when she was 15 years old. The accused was convicted by a jury, and one
111 See R v GF, 2021 SCC 20 [GF] (where Justice Karakatsanis, on behalf of a
majority of the Supreme Court, wrote: “[w]here ambiguities in a trial judge’s reasons are
open to multiple interpretations, those that are consistent with the presumption of correct
application must be preferred over those that suggest error” at para 79).
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of the issues on appeal was whether the trial judge was right to exclude
evidence of a video recording of sexual activity between the accused and
the complainant that took place when the complainant was an adult during
a period covered by the indictment. The Court of Appeal determined that
the video was properly excluded because its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighed any probative value. The prejudicial effect of the video would
flow both from the invasion of the complainant’s privacy and from the “risk
that the jury would be tempted to draw impermissible inferences based on
stereotypes and myths about how sexual assault complainants who allege
long-term abuse should behave.”114 Specifically, there was a danger that
the complainant’s apparent agreement or responsiveness to the sexual
activity depicted in the video would invoke the myths that victims should
resist and remain unresponsive. The complainant’s apparent agreement
could be explained by years of alleged abuse, exploitation and threats, but
there was a risk that it would become, for the jury, “an illegitimate proxy
for consent.”115
In many cases, video recordings of the sexual activity covered by the
charges would have legitimate relevance, including on the issue of consent.
In AE,116 the videos of the violent sexual activity and the complainant’s
protests showed that she did not consent. Conversely, in Percy,117 the trial
judge was entitled to conclude that complainant’s conduct as captured
on video suggested that she willingly participated in the sexual activity
recorded. In both cases, these inferences were reasonable in the context
of disputes about consent involving casual acquaintances who engaged
in sexual activity on one occasion. However, drawing a similar inference
about consent from a video depicting one sexual act in an exploitive sexual
relationship that lasted decades was inappropriate and risked invoking
forbidden reasoning.
D) Beyond sex and gender
A final emerging trend in the law on myths and stereotypes in sexual
assault is a growing concern about discrimination on grounds other
than sex and gender. In R v Barton,118 the accused was charged with first
degree murder after a woman died from an injury he inflicted on her in
the course of sexual activity. This complex and tragic case raised a number
of troubling issues, including concerns about gender-based stereotyping
that were heightened by the trial judge’s failure to apply the mandatory
admissibility standards in s. 276 of the Criminal Code before admitting
114
115
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evidence that the accused and the complainant engaged in sexual activity
on a previous occasion.119 More importantly for present purposes, the
Supreme Court also emphasized the danger that the jury might engage in
stereotyping the deceased because she was an Indigenous woman engaged
in sex work. Writing for the majority, Justice Moldaver recommended
that trial judges offer instructions to juries cautioning them against, in his
words,
a number of troubling stereotypical assumptions about Indigenous women who
perform sex work, including that such persons:
• are not entitled to the same protections the criminal justice system promises
other Canadians;
• are not deserving of respect, humanity, and dignity;
• are sexual objects for male gratification;
• need not give consent to sexual activity and are “available for the taking”;
• assume the risk of any harm that befalls them because they engage in a dangerous
form of work; and
• are less credible than other people.120

The insight that biases against Indigenous and racialized people operate
within the criminal justice system is not new,121 but Barton brings fresh
attention to the ways in which these kinds of bias can amplify stereotypical
reasoning about sexual assault.

119
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R v Slatter122 is another Supreme Court of Canada decision that
highlights myths and stereotypes in sexual assault that are not based on
sex and gender. The complainant in Slatter was a young woman with an
intellectual disability who testified that the accused, a family friend, sexually
assaulted her on various occasions. The accused testified and denied
that the sexual activity occurred. A clinical psychologist who testified
for the Crown gave evidence that people with intellectual disabilities
are predisposed to be suggestible and that the complainant in particular
was suggestible. The complainant had been repeatedly questioned by
authorities about her allegations, which became more serious over time.
The defence argued that the reliability of her evidence was undermined
by the prospect that, because she was suggestible, she was unwittingly
influenced by others in constructing her account. The trial judge convicted
the accused of sexual assault, finding that the complainant’s testimony
was credible and that the Crown had proved its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court of Appeal for Ontario, by a majority, allowed the
appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge’s reasons were
insufficient because he did not address the complainant’s suggestibility
and its impact on the reliability of her testimony. Justice Pepall, in dissent,
would have dismissed the appeal on the basis the trial judge’s reasons for
conviction were adequate: he was alive to the issues of the complainant’s
reliability and suggestibility, and in any event the defence argument about
suggestibility was based on generalized expert evidence and lacked a
factual foundation.
On an appeal as of right, a seven-member Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, adopting
Justice Pepall’s dissenting reasons. In a brief oral judgment for the Court,
Justice Moldaver stressed that the testimony of people with intellectual
and developmental disabilities should be addressed on its individual
merits and not on the basis of “expert evidence that attributes general
characteristics to that individual … Over-reliance on generalities can
perpetuate harmful myths and stereotypes about individuals with
disabilities, which is inimical to the truth-seeking process, and creates
additional barriers for those seeking access to justice.”123 Once again, the
Supreme Court emphasized a form of stereotyping that can affect sexual
assault cases but is not based on sex or gender. Taken together, Barton and
Slatter encourage trial judges to look beyond gender-based stereotyping in
sexual assault cases to consider and guard against stereotyping on other,
overlapping grounds of discrimination like race and disability.124
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4. A new framework of rules
The most significant Canadian case on myths and stereotypes to be
decided in recent years is R v JC.125 As discussed above, a unanimous
Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed a defence appeal against conviction
on grounds related to stereotypes: the trial judge erred in relying on
stereotypes about sexual behaviour to reject the male accused’s claim
that he sought consent expressly and further erred by misidentifying the
defence argument about the complainant’s motive to lie as a stereotype.
More important than these fact-specific determinations is the Court’s
effort to articulate the framework of rules around stereotypical reasoning
in a new way. According to Justice Paciocco, there are actually two
overlapping rules at work:
1. “the rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions”126
and
2. “the rule against stereotypical inferences.”127
These rules are both, Justice Paciocco explains, directed at “impermissible
reasoning relating to the plausibility of human behaviour.”128 The first
rule prohibits judges from speculating and relying on common-sense
assumptions that are not supported by evidence or judicial notice.129 The
second rule prohibits reasoning based on “prejudicial generalizations”130
about human behaviour, including stereotypical assumptions about
how both complainants and accused persons in sexual offence cases are
expected to conduct themselves.131 Justice Paciocco emphasizes that
neither rule represents a wholesale prohibition on inference-drawing
based on common sense and human experience.132 Rather, these rules
prohibit only those common-sense inferences that are unmoored from
the evidence or founded on stereotypes.
This novel way of conceptualizing the prohibition on stereotypical
reasoning appears likely to be influential in Ontario and throughout
human trafficking and sexual services offences against a white female complainant. The
trial judge cautioned himself against relying on myths and stereotypes including racial
biases at paras 16–17).
125 Supra note 9.
126 Ibid at para 58.
127 Ibid at para 63.
128 Ibid at para 57.
129 Ibid at para 58.
130 Ibid at para 65.
131 Ibid at para 63.
132 Ibid at paras 59, 65.
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Canada.133 In R v Pastro,134 the Court of Appeal for British Columbia
cited JC and adopted an analogous two-part analysis, separating the
prohibition against “generalizations about expected human behaviour
that are unsupported by the evidence”135 and the prohibition against
“stereotypic reasoning.”136 While framing the analysis as comprising two
rules may seem to complicate the law, this dual structure nicely captures
two distinct problems: prejudgments about certain groups, like women
and sexual assault complainants, and assumptions about human behaviour
that are not properly grounded in evidence. Both of these problems have
been consistently recognized in the case law on myths and stereotypes.137
Acknowledging that these problems are separate but overlapping helpfully
clarifies the law.
As discussed above, it can be difficult to distinguish legitimate
inferences grounded in common sense and human experience from
prohibited stereotypical reasoning.138 Canadian courts have been
somewhat inconsistent and unclear about when reasoning about human
behaviour crosses that line.139 The analytical structure provided in JC
should help to clarify the law on this point by providing guidance on what,
precisely, is prohibited. As Justice Paciocco takes pains to point out, the
fact that a lawyer or judge relies on common sense and human experience
to draw inferences from human behaviour in a sexual assault trial does
not, by itself, make those inferences objectionable. What JC calls on
courts to avoid are inferences that lack a foundation in the evidence and
generalizations and assumptions that are unfair and prejudicial, including
stereotypes about male and female sexuality. Thus, as Justice Paciocco
explains, it was unacceptable for a trial judge to rely, in convicting an
accused, on a pure generalization that a complainant would not have
consented to have sex outside on the dirt and gravel in December in
the absence of any evidence about the particular complainant’s attitude
toward her appearance, clothing and comfort.140 That inference was
improper because it lacked an evidentiary foundation. On the other hand,
a trial judge was entitled to find it implausible that the complainant would
133
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consent to have sex with the accused on a balcony open to public view
where there was evidence that the complainant was not interested in
engaging in sex with the accused and that a private bedroom was readily
available.141 That inference was grounded in the evidence and did not
draw on any prejudicial generalizations about women’s sexuality. The
guidance provided in JC should assist courts in drawing the distinction
between permissible and impermissible inferences by providing a
common language and a conceptual structure for the analysis.
One would not, of course, want to overstate the extent to which JC has
resolved all the problems in this difficult area of law. Consider, for example,
the apparent connection between the strength of the generalization relied
on by the trial judge and its permissibility. In several cases, appellate
Courts have ruled that trial judges err when they reason that no person
or woman would ever agree to engage in the sexual activity in issue.142
In Pastro,143 where the 17-year-old complainant claimed to have been
sexually assaulted by a 49-year-old friend of her father, the Court of Appeal
for British Columbia recognized that the trial judge would have erred if he
had relied on “stereotypic assumptions” and “perceived universal truths”
about whether 17-year-old girls are interested in sex with 49-year-old
men.144 However, the Court concluded that the trial judge did not err in
the circumstances because his reasoning about the implausibility of the
complainant’s consent was grounded in the complainant’s testimony that
she found the accused’s sexual attentions “‘creepy’, ‘weird’, ‘inappropriate’
and ‘disgusting’”.145
It seems clear from Pastro that the strong generalization that no
17-year-old girl would ever engage in consensual sex with a 49-year-old
man would amount to prohibited reasoning. What seems less clear is
whether weaker generalizations along similar lines might be acceptable.
For example, would the trial judge be entitled to consider that teenaged
girls sometimes or often experience the sexual attentions of middleaged men as inappropriate? The analysis in JC does not provide a ready
141
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answer to this question. The answer may depend on whether any such
generalization would be accepted as true by well-informed members of
the community, such that it would be an appropriate subject for judicial
notice.146 The possibility that common-sense reasoning could survive the
rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions by being grounded
in judicial notice is raised in JC but not discussed at length.147 Its
implications remain to be explored in future cases. In sum, the framework
of rules announced in JC has advanced and clarified the law on myths and
stereotypes in sexual assault, but significant uncertainties remain.
Arguably, the new framework in JC advances the law most significantly
in its capaciousness: Justice Paciocco defines the rules at a high enough
level of abstraction that they can account for all the complexities that
have developed in the law on myths and stereotypes. They apply equally
to assumptions about women, men, complainants and accused persons;
to sexual offence cases and other cases; to stereotypes based on sex and
gender and stereotypes based on other grounds of discrimination. They
recognize that judges can err both by relying on stereotypes and by rejecting
legitimate inferences as stereotypes,148 and that evidence that could give
rise to stereotypical inferences may also be relevant and admissible for
other, legitimate purposes.149 While no way of articulating rules can
entirely eliminate the problem of close or difficult cases, Justice Paciocco
provides a number of factual examples of permissible and impermissible
inferences that should assist courts in drawing this distinction in future
cases. In short, the JC decision articulates the organizing principles in the
law on myths and stereotypes in a way that captures the issues raised in
past cases and can serve as the foundation for future developments.
The principal weakness of the framework laid out in JC also flows
from its capaciousness. Since Justice Paciocco defines the governing
rules in an abstract way that is neutral between accused persons and
complainants, women and men, sexual offences and other offences,
the particular problem of gender-based stereotyping of female sexual
assault complainants risks being obscured. Recall that to this point,
and particularly in the judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, the
problem of myths and stereotypes in sexual assault has been understood
almost exclusively as a problem of sexist stereotypes against female
complainants. This understanding, in turn, has reflected an appropriate
acknowledgment of the deep history and continuing reality of sex and
146
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gender discrimination in the prosecution of sexual offences in Canada.
To conceptualize the law on myths and stereotypes in a way that fails to
acknowledge this context would be ahistorical and regressive. At the same
time, the analysis in this paper has shown that an understanding focused
exclusively on sex and gender-based discrimination against complainants
simply cannot account for the many complications that arise regularly in
the law on myths and stereotypes in sexual assault. The best way forward
may be for the courts to employ the useful framework provided by JC
while remaining keenly aware of the special implications of this body of
law for women and complainants in sexual offence cases.
5. Conclusion
Myths and stereotypes remain a persistent problem in Canadian sexual
offence prosecutions. Most often, these prejudicial lines of reasoning are
invoked by lawyers and judges against sexual assault complainants and
amount to a form of discrimination on the basis of sex and gender. A
review of the recent case law demonstrates that myths and stereotypes
also arise in other contexts, however. Some cases involve stereotypical
reasoning being deployed against men and accused persons, while others
raise issues of stereotyping based on other grounds of discrimination
including Indigeneity, race and disability. The case law also demonstrates
that the line between stereotypical reasoning and permissible inferences
can be difficult to draw and that judges sometimes mistakenly reject
legitimate defence evidence and arguments as raising stereotypes. The
overall picture is complex. The recent attempt by the Court of Appeal for
Ontario in JC to impose order in this area represents a real advance of
the law. That Court’s proposed rules against ungrounded common-sense
assumptions and stereotypical inferences are framed broadly enough to
contain all the complications presented in the case law. If those rules are
more widely adopted, the challenge will be ensuring that the original and
continuing problem of gender-based stereotypes against sexual assault
complainants is not forgotten.

